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Abstract: China’s engagement with Africa has drawn the attention of policy makers 
worldwide. While Chinese interests in the region appear relatively passive at present, there 
is the potential for either a detrimental or largely positive impact on US interests. I assert 
that the US should engage with Chinese to support both their interests while providing a 
quantum leap for African development. 
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Introduction 
This thesis will disprove the conventional wisdom that Chinese foreign aid policy in 
Africa is detrimental to US interests. By utilizing case studies on Zimbabwe, Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and if properly engaged, the US and China can work together to 
resolve some of Africa’s intractable issues while providing a new pathway for increased 
economic development for Africa. To assist the reader in understanding the arguments made, an 
overview of China foreign aid policy is provided. 
There are two major international relations theories for interpreting China’s foreign aid 
policy in Africa: realism and liberalism. A response based on the realist theory of international 
relations requires the US to respond with hostility. Such a response would include measures 
designed to negate Chinese foreign aid policies considered detrimental to US interests. A 
response within the liberalist theory of international relations sees Chinese foreign aid policy in 
Africa as being beneficial to US interests. This response would likely call for collaboration on 
joint, non-adversarial African interests, ultimately culminating for a largely positive development 
for US interests. My interpretation and subsequent policy suggestion will conform within the 
liberalist confines.  
Research Design 
Importance of Issue 
From a policy perspective, this issue represents an opportunity to define the US-China 
relationship outside of direct country-to-country interests, meaning issues that are only between 
the US and China. Actions taken will define US-China foreign relations for years to come. It 
should provide the US with an important medium to include China for roles in solving some of 
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Africa’s entrenched conflicts and problems in the Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe while taking 
advantage of the investment opportunities in those developing economies.  
Previous Research 
Traditionally, academic research and mainstream media articles have largely portrayed 
Chinese foreign aid policy in Africa as little more than a grab for natural resources. This is 
reflected in conventional wisdom and the realist theory of international relations in that China is 
viewed as a competitive threat to US interests. However, recent research and a growing number 
of media articles have an updated viewpoint that better reflects the overall aim of current 
Chinese foreign aid policy. The Chinese appear to have softened their stance on the most blatant 
violators of human rights as they seem more attentive to their international image. This has been 
demonstrated through the nomination of a special envoy to Africa in additional to loans to 
Zimbabwe have been cut off due to lack of payment and to a lesser extent due to the reaction by 
the international community. The Chinese also seem more pro-active on promoting their views 
on human rights and are moving away from justifying their policies using the sovereignty 
arguments, an argument which helped to fuel the criticism from the research reflecting 
conventional wisdom. Thus, this opens the door for increased US cooperation in Africa with 
China. 
Argument 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this thesis will disprove that Chinese foreign aid in 
Africa is detrimental to US interests in the region. Strictly viewing only the headlines, Chinese 
policy does seem detrimental to US interests. Chinese foreign aid policy of leveraging a 
country’s natural resources for economic development projects provides an attractive alternative 
to US foreign aid programs. Instead of dictating the terms of such assistance to include human 
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rights, good governance and other soft power projects, China argues that attaching such policies 
to foreign aid projects is a violation of that country’s sovereignty, which is attractive to those 
countries who do not qualify for US aid on those bases. Those headlines make that argument that 
the Chinese expanded programs in Africa after Mao’s death, cut them in the 1980’s and 
revitalized them recently in order to develop Africa’s natural resource potential. However, there 
is much beyond that simplistic interpretation.  
Through analysis of China’s official foreign aid policy, past and present, the following 
can be shown. The Chinese have been successful at utilizing foreign aid programs to build 
external support for their human rights agenda within international organizations, particularly at 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council. China’s foreign aid policy aims to better its 
international image, about which it cares very deeply, and which contradicts the conventional 
wisdom argument that China supports violators of human rights. Recent actions by senior 
Chinese officials denote this change of direction with support for Zimbabwe and Sudan. This 
shift in policy provides an opening for a US-China partnership for addressing fundamental 
African issues of interest to both countries. 
Definition of Terms 
Foreign aid is defined as the “annual subsides and subventions are a time-honored means 
of assuring the loyalty of client states (Dictionary, page 8).” Foreign aid is a means for wealthy 
countries use foreign aid to cultivate relationships with client countries where the donor 
anticipates that “the economic well-being of an indigent ally will strengthen both parties in their 
pursuit of common objectives (Dictionary, page 9).” The second part of the definition states that 
donors view foreign aid as a way to better the economies of recipients in order to strengthen the 
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client-donor relationship towards pursuing common objectives. China foreign aid policy falls 
within that definition. 
The definition of foreign aid was further broken down by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee in 1969 and 
1972. Officially Defined Aid (ODA) must be government concessional funding with a grant 
element of 25% or more and be given developing countries or through institutions who then 
distribute ODA less directly. ODA must promote economic and welfare development. Other 
Official Flows (OOF) is any assistance that does not meet ODA guidelines (Brautgam, 2010). 
OOF often includes loans with competitive or even interest free rates. The term foreign aid 
encompasses both OOF and ODA.  
Data utilized towards disproving the hypothesis will include the amount of foreign aid to 
Africa compared in specific years, primarily OFA. However, direct comparisons with <LATER> 
are difficult as OOF data are not widely available. 
Data Utilized to Disprove Hypothesis 
Case studies of three African countries will be utilized to disprove the thesis that China’s 
foreign aid policy to Africa is detrimental to US interests. China’s recent involvement in Sudan 
is a departure from previously stated official policy of non-interference within other countries’ 
internal affairs. China has suspended loans to Zimbabwe on the basis of non-payment and the 
reactions of the international community. In the Congo, China modified a foreign aid deal in 
response to criticism from the IMF and the international community that the deal unvalued 
Congo’s natural resource wealth (Marks, 2009). Chinese involvement with IGO’s such as 
African Union, development of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Marks, 2009) 
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highlights that they are willing to work within the framework of IGOs to advance their interests 
which proves their ability to compromise.  
Significance of Research 
 Chinese engagement with Africa has the potential to be either detrimental to US interests 
or highly beneficial. Thus, it is important that US policy makers understand the nature of China-
Africa engagement and develop a policy that promotes cooperation with China for Africa’s 
benefit, and the benefit of both US and China interests. Achieving a win-win-win for all parties 
will help define the US-China relationship well into the future. A lack of understanding on behalf 
of the US could lead to ineffective policy and a less than productive relationship with one of the 
world’s developing great powers, China. The China-US relationship will be a central part of 
future US foreign policy. 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
There is a wide range of literature discussing China’s role in Africa, and implications for 
the US. Most begin by stating how quickly Chinese engagement in Africa has grown in recent 
years. Then, they either delve into the implications on whether Chinese engagement is 
advantageous for African countries or disadvantageous. Some literature discusses implications 
for US interests in Africa. Most literature can be organized into one of two groups: conventional 
wisdom and academic perspectives.  
Conventional Wisdom 
Numerous headlines and major media outlets typically describe China as an aggressive 
power seeking material resources in Africa in exchange for infrastructure projects and loans, 
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occasionally portrayed as great disadvantage to the receiving African country. This viewpoint is 
the conventional wisdom as it is based in what people immediately think of when briefed on this 
topic. Also, major media outlets quickly make connections between the receiving country’s 
policies on human rights and China engagement as wholly supportive of those policies, 
essentially accusing China of propping up African strongmen and dictators. Assistant Secretary 
Johnnie Carson discussed China with oil companies Lagos in February 2010 stating that while 
the US does not consider China a threat from a security standpoint, “China is a very aggressive 
and pernicious economic competitor with no morals.” He also stated that “China is in Africa for 
China…(10LAGOS75).” It reflects the conversation as the Assistant Secretary appears to be 
attempting to ingrain some forewarning into the unnamed international oil companies that China 
is a significant competitor.  
Hanson presents Chinese engagement as primarily fueled by natural resources, ignoring 
the larger implications of their aid policy on US interests. In writing for the Heritage 
Foundation, Brookes and Shin present Chinese foreign policy as an attempt to counter US and 
Western political and economic influence in Africa. Instead of working together with China to 
best develop Africa, Brookes and Shin suggest expanding US presence in the region. An 
increased diplomatic presence, additional discussions on human rights, democracy and good 
governance, expanded trade and larger investments in strategic commodities such as oil, and an 
expanded security presence would all help deter China.  
Thus, this perspective portrays Chinese engagement in Africa largely negatively and not 
supportive of US interests. Instead of seeing a potential for cooperation, this literature largely 
suggests that the US counter the Chinese dollar for dollar. It best reflects the realist theory of 
international relations. 
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Academic Perspective 
In contrast, most of the academic community’s literature portrays China more positively. 
It draws on deeper and broader research than media articles. Therefore, the evidence and 
methods used to acquire that evidence are more persuasive.  
Bräutigam 
Deborah Bräutigam discusses Chinese development projects in Africa through her 2010 
book, The Dragon’s Gift. She focuses primarily on how Chinese aid projects typically work, 
including motivations by China, Chinese expectations of recipients, and specifically how foreign 
aid projects are funded and implemented. Bräutigam discusses the differences between Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF), stating that most Western aid 
is ODA while most Chinese aid is OOF. Bräutigam has done more research individual Chinese 
development projects in Africa than anyone else, including the Chinese government themselves.1 
While her research is broadly objective, extensive cooperation with Chinese officials has slightly 
altered how China is portrayed in her work.  
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Africa Program 
At a 2007 conference hosted by CSIS and others, the subsequent conference report, U.S. 
and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation 
discusses Chinese engagement in Kenya, Nigeria and Angola. Out of that discussion, themes on 
areas for cooperation between the US and China emerged. CSIS proposes that the US and China 
work together to further their interests in Africa, drawing on CSIS research and a CSIS 
delegation to China to support their notion that both countries have mutual interests. As with 
                                                           
1 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-x88elSF2c&NR=1 
Bräutigam mentions that the Chinese government foreign aid officials appreciated her book, Chinese Aid and 
African Development: Exporting Green Revolution, (St. Martin's Press, 1998), as an evaluation of their own aid 
projects in Africa as they had no evaluation means of their own. 
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Bräutigam, CSIS has a slightly altered viewpoint due to extensive cooperation with Chinese 
officials. 
Ambassador David Shinn 
Ambassador David Shinn primarily compares US and Chinese interests in Africa. In 
Comparing Engagement with Africa by China and the United States, Shinn discusses the interests of 
the US and China in Africa, concluding that they are similar despite popular opinion that they are 
not. In China's relations with Zimbabwe, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he 
presents each country and their specific relationship with China. He concludes that the human 
rights challenges faced by each country drive them closer to China and away from Western 
influence. Shinn suggests that the similarities between US and Chinese interests in Africa create 
a base for broader cooperation. As a Foreign Service Officer, Amb. Shinn has served in 
numerous African posts including Ambassador to Ethiopia. Thus, his viewpoint is rooted in his 
experiences in east African states.  
Other Perspectives 
Butts and Bankus argue that not only would engaging China on African issues augment US 
interests but that it would help to continue to build the US-China relationship. That engagement would 
prevent the situation from devolving into a zero-sum game which would likely be costly for the US. 
Pehnelt presents Chinese engagement with Africa using a critical, academic approach. He 
summarizes that the Group of Eight (G8) countries should acknowledge China’s foreign aid 
policy. He suggests that the G8 work with China to integrate their efforts within the broader 
context of development for Africa. Turin discusses Chinese foreign aid policy with the context of 
the “Beijing Consensus.” He concludes that China’s role as an alternative to traditional foreign 
aid will allow them to become more prominent within the international development community, 
particularly in Africa. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) compares the influence of the 
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US and China in Africa. While no specific position is taken, the CRS summarizes US interests 
are similar to Chinese ones and thus are not directly harmed by Chinese actions.  
Thus, there is a clear view amongst this literature that Chinese engagement with Africa is 
not detrimental to US interests. There are opportunities for cooperation between China and the 
US in Africa. This literature is reflective of the liberal theory of international relations as it views 
Chinese actions within the context of cooperation instead of a being direct threat to US interests. 
Conclusion 
Comparing both conventional wisdom and the academic perspective, the latter best 
supports the conclusions of the thesis. It draws upon broader information and best documents 
recent changes in Chinese policy. 
Body of Thesis 
Official Chinese Foreign Aid Policy 
China officially outlined their foreign aid policy towards Africa in a 2006 policy paper, 
China’s African Policy. China bases much of its foreign policy on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence:  1) mutual respect of sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression against other 
sovereigns, 3) mutual non-interfere in internal affairs, 4) mutual benefit and equality, and 5) 
peaceful co-existence (Jiabao, 2004). In African Policy, China expands further on those 
principles by stating that they respect their choices concerning development. They encourage 
sustainable development2 that produces benefits that are shared equally among everyone. Also, 
they encourage mutual support at the United Nations and in other inter-governmental 
organizations. On the political front, they state that they will continue the high level visits 
                                                           
2 In this context, sustainable development refers to projects that will eventually be able to continue automously 
and without help from the donor government. 
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between African and Chinese leaders, expand exchanges between legislative bodies including the 
Pan-African Parliament of the African Union, encourage additional exchanges between political 
parties of Africa and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), increase the links between local 
governments of China and Africa, and will develop the dialogue on foreign affairs cooperation 
between African governments and China. In terms of economics, China will remove trade 
impediments on African commodities entering the Chinese market and remove tariffs on exports 
from the least developed states. Beijing does not commit to Free Trade Agreements at the present 
but leaves the timeframe open-ended. China will continue to construct infrastructure projects 
through its private and state enterprises. Loan forgiveness is another major part of foreign aid 
policy. On the civil side, China’s foreign policy calls for expanding cultural, health, education 
and social linkages between the African and Chinese peoples. In terms of military relations, 
Beijing will continue to provide training for African militaries, joint exercises and exchanges, 
cooperation on rule of law and judicial projects, and for civilian policing practices. Finally, 
Beijing sees a prominent role for China-Africa Cooperation in terms of pursuing these goals and 
developments ("China's african policy," 2006). Overall, the policy paper takes a positive tone 
and represents what Beijing has communicated through official and public channels.  
Defining Chinese Aid Policy 
Chinese foreign aid to African countries is a combination of diplomacy, commerce and 
ODA and OOF aid. The Beijing Consensus provides a basis for Chinese foreign policy. It 
encourages innovation and equitable development (Turin, 2010) and principles of self-
determination (CRS-9).  It also measures progress with metrics other than GDP, in contrast to the 
Washington Consensus. By GDP alone, China ranks 102 out of 182 countries in the UNDP’s 
2007 estimate. Accounting for other factors such as the Human Development Index, literacy and 
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life expectancy, China jumps to 52 (Turin, 2010). Focusing on these additional factors helps 
China develop an assistance package for a particular country.  
Officially, China gives very little traditional aid in the form of grants, preferring instead 
to give out loans. Therefore, much of Chinese aid is considered OOF instead of ODA. Chinese 
aid is often characterized as “win-win” (CRS-1), meaning that both the state giving the aid and 
the state receiving the aid acknowledge that the relationship is equitable, per the Beijing 
Consensus. “Win-win” is essentially copied from the Japanese model of foreign aid. First, China 
extends large amounts of credit at a competitive or even sub-market rate. They then require that 
much of the money be spent on Chinese goods such as construction equipment and services, 
machinery, and mass transportation. Repayment is often tied to natural resources such as oil or 
rare metals instead of coming directly from the recipient country’s treasury. The “win-win” 
approach is becoming increasingly popular in Africa and countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (D.R. Congo), Mozambique and Angola have taken advantage assistance 
offers structured this way (Bräutigam, page 307). 
How Much Foreign Aid 
The amount of foreign aid China gives to Africa is difficult to determine. Several 
agencies play an active role in determining and implementing aid policies. Private companies, 
provincial governments and state owned corporations are involved as well. Individual embassies 
and the Chinese diplomatic corps are included in the process in varying roles. Additionally, none 
of these organizations are transparent about their aid policies. In 2004, $731.2 million was 
China’s officially released aid statistic but they do not define what they consider aid. However, 
the official number conforms to ODA norms. Under OOF, the ExIm Bank lent 12.5 billion 
(USD) in 2006 and 17.5 billion (USD) in 2007 (Pehnelt, 2007). In a 2008 speech on the 
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Millennium Development Goals, Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao disclosed that 31 billion (USD) in 
aid had been given to developing countries, which included 13.6 billion (USD) in “free aid 
(Jiabao, 2008).” Speeches by Chinese officials provide some light onto the amount of aid but fail 
to define when or what exactly is aid. Premier Jaibao used to term “free aid” but to include 
specifics of the nature of the aid According to official standards (ODA), China gives roughly 
1.5-2 billion (USD) per year compared to the 19.5billion in ODA that the US gave in 2007. 
However, neither country includes the entire amount of OOF as the US excludes military 
assistance while the Chinese figure excludes loans that constitute their primary source of 
development aid (CRS-4). Thus, it is difficult to quantify the amount of foreign aid that both 
China and the US give. 
History of China in Africa 
 The Chinese have maintained ties with Africa longer than is commonly thought. Admiral 
Zheng He visited what is now Somalia in the 15th century, bringing giraffes back to China for the 
emperor. In 1956, China gave Egypt aid, the first African recipient of Chinese foreign aid in the 
modern era. Swaziland is the only country that has never received Chinese assistance. In the 
1970’s, China sponsored its biggest project ever, building the Tanzania-Zambia railway to 
connect Zambia’s copper mines to Tanzanian ports. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, China 
awarded smaller infrastructure repair grants to many African governments. The only political 
condition of those grants and aid was that the recipient government recognized the People’s 
Republic of China as the only China and cut ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan)  
(Bräutigam, 2010). 
 The events of 1989 in Tiananmen Square prompted a broad change in Chinese foreign 
policy. Beijing was surprised by the international community’s outcry on its human rights policy, 
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which included many countries that they thought were friendly to their interests. The policy that 
seems to have emerged from that era was a reengagement with countries whose support would 
count in international government organizations such as the UN in additional to regional 
alliances. 
 In the subsequent years of the 1990’s, China began to reach out once more to African 
countries. From 1989 to 1992, the Chinese Foreign Minister visited fourteen countries in Africa, 
resuming the high level visits that had subsided after Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 1982 trip to eleven 
countries. Many of those countries subsequently sent delegations to Beijing, signifying the 
positive impact of the high level of Chinese engagement. Through aid projects such as $12 
million (USD) in assistance to Mozambique in the early 1990’s, China worked to retain and 
expand allies that would support Chinese human rights policy or support China’s position on 
sovereignty, namely their disinterest in a country’s internal affairs. China’s actions 
systematically built support in the UN as Western countries constitute an absolute minority. 
Additionally, it was in the early to mid 90’s that China began to dramatically (?) increase trade 
with Africa. From 1990, trade increased from $1.66 billion to more than $5.03 billion in 1997. 
Stability was the only political condition China required for aid, investment, and trade, thus 
allowing a place for countries with less than democratic governments to be included within 
Chinese foreign policy (Taylor, 1998). 
Political Goals and Measurements of Success 
Traditionally, China has had few expectations on political goals for foreign aid. In the 
past, they cared little for the longer term impact of their foreign aid policy.3 Today, they are far 
more sensitive to their image amongst the international community. 
                                                           
3 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-x88elSF2c&NR=1 
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Recognition of one China has been a major part of this, originating as a way to reclaim 
the UN Security Council seat and continuing afterwards as a way to delegitimize the Republic of 
China (Taiwan). Taiwan competed successfully with China on matching foreign aid dollar for 
dollar until the late 1990’s. In recent years, China has been able to offer more generous foreign 
aid packages than Taiwan. In 2005, Senegal cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Malawi did 
the same in 2008 after accepting a 6 billion USD aid package from China. Four African countries 
recognize only Taiwan while thirteen did so in 1994 (Halper, 2010). This is an indication of 
China foreign policy success.  
At the United Nations, China has built up a powerful coalition of countries willing to 
support their agenda. This coalition has prevailed in stopping the UN Commission on Human 
Rights from denouncing China’s human rights policy. Taiwan has been unable to join the World 
Health Organization in part because of the opposition of many African states (Brookes, 2006). A 
recent European Council on Foreign Relations report stated that support within the General 
Assembly for Chinese positions on sovereignty and against external interference rose from 50% 
to 74% between 1998 and 2008 (Gowan and Brantner, 2010). This is in part due to China’s 
foreign policy of seeking out countries that support their positions at international organizations. 
This leap in support indicates the success of China’s foreign policy in Africa. 
What can be concluded is that Chinese foreign policy is driven by China’s ideas on an 
ideal self image. Of course, this is not clearly stated but is more discernable through their actions 
such as building support for their human rights agenda and obtaining diplomatic recognition of 
China as a legitimate state.  
Who is in Charge? 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
In this presentation, Bräutigam states that her 1998 book, Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green 
Revolution, (St. Martin's Press, 1998) was utilized by some Chinese government officials to research their own 
previous foreign aid policy efforts as they lacked effective means to do so on their own. 
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The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MC), in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), is in charge of foreign aid. More specifically, the Department of Foreign Aid 
(MOFCOM) within the MC is in charge of grants, a youth volunteer program, zero-interest 
loans, and technical assistance. Also under control of the MC is China’s Export-Import Bank 
(ExIm Bank) which manages the concessional foreign aid loan program (Bräutigam, 2010). 
ExIm Bank is more or less a policy bank, combining diplomacy, business, and development 
goals. As a policy bank, ExIm Bank is not expected to profit but merely break even so as not to 
require sustained outside funding. MOFCOM administered programs support wide-ranging 
diplomatic goals such as not recognizing Taiwan. Other organizations involved in the decision-
making process include the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, individual embassies, and the State Council. Several provincial level 
governments have also been involved to some capacity through their state-owned corporations. 
While the Ministries define and allocate funds to specific policies, the Chinese diplomatic corps 
working out of the embassies function in a project managerial role (Pehnelt, 2007).  
Funding Mechanisms 
Most of China’s foreign aid is OOF. China provides a loan to a developing country to 
build a large income generating project such as a hydroelectric dam or rebuild a road or railroad. 
The loan is paid off through the flow of raw materials such as minerals, oil or timber, and often 
times on revenues from the new infrastructure (Bräutigam). Therefore, long term debt is not a 
concern as resources are leveraged instead of hard currency. Additionally, state-owned 
companies often provide financing instead of the central government.  
In October of 2000, China hosted a summit of 45 African country leaders in Beijing. 
They agreed to create mutually advantageous economic development, further cooperation on 
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trade, and enhanced political relations. It became known as the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) and the founding countries have met three additional times, once every 
three years. It provides a forum for bilateral and continental levels cooperation. A plethora of 
initiatives have been announced through this forum. At the 2006 FOCAC summit in Beijing, 
President Hu Jintao announced the China-Africa Development Fund with an eventual 
capitalization of 5 billion dollars (USD), doubling of 2006 assistance by 2009, and construction 
of an African Union headquarters, (‘Soft Power’, page 108-110). The Fund was created to better 
facilitate public sector investment as well to prime the pump for private sector investment. 
Overseen by the China Development Bank, it may invest in convertible bonds, stocks, 
investment funds, and other quasi-equity type of investments. Funds such as this serve as 
catalysts for private sector investment. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the 
roughly US $540 million invested in 27 African project will drive some US $3.6 billion in 
private sector investment by Chinese corporations ("China-Africa Development Fund," 2010). 
Through innovative and large investment mechanisms, China is poised to expand their foreign 
aid development exponentially.  Thus, China has shown a willingness to work with partners to 
better Africa, providing an opening for a broader US-China engagement in the region. 
Engagement: Selected Case Studies 
Zimbabwe 
Even before Robert Gabriel Mugabe was in power, Beijing supported his Zimbabwe 
African National Union in the 1970s. After Mugabe failed by and large to obtain support from 
the West in the 1980s, he rekindled the relationship by defending Beijing’s role in the 
Tiananmen Square massacre (Shinn, 2008). Earlier this year, Mugabe choose to celebrate his 86th 
birthday at the Chinese embassy in Harare, signifying how entangled Mugabe has become with 
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the giant in the East. "We treasure this friendship. It's not really the relations that count, but the 
love, alliance and understanding (Moyo, 2010).” That was how Mugabe characterized the 
relationship.  
 Within Zimbabwe, China has quietly taken control of major industries and sources of 
wealth. Large Chinese multi-nationals such as Sinosteel own 92% of Zimasco, the largest 
ferrechrome company, while Sino-Cement possesses a large stake in Zimbabwe’s cement 
industry. In terms of natural resources, China Sonangol has several large mining holdings and 
other stakes are being granted to Chinese firms such as Jinchuan Nickel Mining Company 
instead of Zimbabwean or African mining companies (Moyo, 2010). China receives the lion’s 
share of Zimbabwe’s tobacco exports while Zimbabwe purchases large equipment such as K-8 
trainer jets for their air force. Peter Chamada, son of a senior ZANU-PF scion who is close to 
Mugabe summed up the shift from the West to the East. “We don’t want anything to do with you 
people. We have shifted, from you guys [white Africans] to the Asians…we have nothing to do 
with you. We want to deal with friendlier people, the Chinamen many of them, Indians, not you” 
(“Mugabe and”, 38:50). Mr. Chamada highlights the newer thinking of midlevel Zimbabwean 
government officials in terms of whose relationships have increased priority and importance.  
However, Zimbabwe’s economy has recently imploded as the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe grossly expanded the money supply, eventually resorting to printing a 100 billion 
dollar banknote, in order to keep Mugabe’s government solvent. Zimbabwean currency has 
become so worthless that foreign banknotes have been since become the quasi-official currency 
of Zimbabwe. As early as 2007 and before the inflation crisis and global economic recession, 
Zimbabwe was unable to make payments on Chinese loans (Shinn, 2008). Therefore, Beijing has 
significant leverage over Harare as a creditor and as a political partner as they supportMugabe in 
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international forums such as the UN. China has been able to take over additional assets owned or 
controlled by Harare but even with that, Beijing seems to have lost patience. Zimbabwean 
Deputy PM Arthur Mutambara upon returning from a trip to Beijing, stated that China has 
stopped providing loans until Zimbabwe restarts payments on existing loans. Despite this set 
back, China has allowed Zimbabwe to reschedule payments on existing loans by an additional 
three years (Moyo, 2010). The case of Zimbabwe highlights the risks of having relationships 
with political renegades and that even Beijing has limits on how much support they can provide 
to their African allies.  
China’s relationship with Zimbabwe is a very profitable one despite lack of payments on 
loans. The natural resources, primary those related to mining, are valuable trade goods. As a 
condition for non-payment on loans, China has taken stakes in state owned corporations in both 
mining and telecommunications. As long as Zimbabwe cannot make loan payments, China has 
slowly taken up equity stakes major Zimbabwean industrial enterprises. While there are laws 
limiting stakes foreigners can take, China appears to be immune from those laws (Moyo, 2010). 
Control of key parts of the Zimbabwean economy could prove helpful should the US and China 
consolidate their interests on Zimbabwe.  
Sudan 
While China has had relations with Sudan since 1959, it has only been in recent years 
that they have grown closer. Shortly after grabbing power in 1989, Sudanese leader Omar al-
Bashir went to China to obtain assistance for jumpstarting the Sudanese oil industry. With 
Malaysian and Canadian4 partners, China has developed the Sudanese oil industry (Shinn, 2008), 
exporting 214,000 barrels per day for Chinese consumption by 2009, some 55% of Sudan’s total 
                                                           
4 The Canadian company withdrew in reaction to human rights concerns and was replaced by an Indian state oil 
company. 
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output (Dep. of Energy, 2009). While a majority of the 6 billion (USD) China has invested in 
Sudan has gone to the oil industry, China constructed Merowe Dam and the Kajbar Dam for 1.5 
billion (USD) on the Nile. Additional infrastructure projects have also been built (Shinn, 2008). 
Politically, Khartoum and Beijing have grown closer in recent years. First, the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 produced a backlash from the international community that 
China had not expected. Therefore, China embarked on a diplomatic expansion, reaching out to 
Sudan and many other developing states as a way to build positive international support, 
particularly towards their human rights record (Taylor, 1998). China’s policy of non-interference 
with the internal affairs of other governments has largely pleased Sudan and China remains their 
most successful energy partner in Africa (Hanson, 2008). China has also sold Sudan military 
weapons and has helped Khartoum develop a domestic arms manufacturing capability. Beijing 
used its influence on the UN Security Council to prevent UN peacekeepers from being deployed 
to Darfur as well as threatening to veto all but the lightest of economic sanctions. China's deputy 
foreign minister, Zhou Wenzhong, summed up his government’s position best in a 2004 
interview. “We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in 
the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them (French, 2004).” 
That mentality is evidence of China’s lack of desire to influence the internal affairs of other 
countries, even allies. This support for countries with poor human rights records fuels the 
conventional wisdom viewpoint which is most commonly articulated to Americans through 
major media outlets. 
As with Zimbabwe, Beijing began losing patience with Sudan in 2007 as President Hu 
Jintao held “frank” talks with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum (Bräutigam, page 
282). Shortly afterwards, Liu Guijin, China’s top African diplomat became a special envoy to 
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Sudan who later described Darfur as “a humanitarian disaster.” China has since become more 
cooperative towards resolving the situation (Shinn, 2008). This represents a change in China’s 
attitude towards Sudan, as they are roughly following international norms by talking with the 
concerned party on working towards resolving the situation. While China and Sudan are still 
close politically, China harbors higher expectations from their ally in terms of resolving the 
Darfur situation. This supports the academic perspective that China has become more sensitive to 
the issue of human rights and its impact on their international image. Thus, it opens the door to 
US-China cooperation on Sudan issues. 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 While China has had diplomatic relations with D.R. Congo since the 1960’s, only 
recently has the relationship been leveraged for mutual benefit. In late 2007, China announced a 
9 billion (USD) worth of infrastructure projects to be paid for with raw material exports, mainly 
copper and cobalt. Those infrastructure projects include renovating a major railway, building 
power plants and transmission lines, constructing four large universities and repairing roads. An 
additional 3 billion USD will be invested as part of a joint venture, Sino-Congolese mining 
company. Profits from that investment will repay the 3 billion and then the 9 billion. While the 
style of the deal fits within the norms of Chinese foreign aid, the size of the deal attracted the 
attention and comments of Western media outlets as well as the IMF (Shinn, 2008). Those 
comments largely reflect conventional wisdom. 
Answer to the thesis: Chinese engagement with Africa is detrimental to US interests 
 
 Based on the evidence provided, there is no reason to fear increasing levels Chinese 
engagement in Africa. In fact, China’s increased presence in Africa should be embraced and 
utilized for a broader cooperation with the United States. 
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US Government Openness to Expanded Chinese Engagement 
As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton is the principal articulator of foreign policy. While 
there are numerous senior advisors in charge of different issues, in theory, the Secretary has the 
last word unless otherwise directed by the President. On a recent trip to Australia, Secretary 
Clinton discussed China at an appearance with Australian foreign minister, Kevin Rudd,. “We 
want to see China’s rise be successful, bring benefits to the Chinese people, but to take on 
greater responsibility and a rules-based approach to all of its neighbors (Gaoette, 2010).” In the 
statement, Clinton acknowledged China’s rise as something that benefits the US. In her 
comments, Clinton encouraged China to step up in terms of conforming to international norms 
by suggesting that such behavior is the responsibility for a great power such as China. In 
suggesting that the Chinese take on greater responsibility, the US sees a clear role for China as a 
great power. What Clinton understands is that the Chinese care very much about their image and 
what other countries say about them and that image. By calling for them to take greater 
responsibility, the Secretary makes clear that not only are the Chinese a major international 
player but one that can take on more responsibility to help solve intractable African problems.  
 In writing for the U.S. Army War College, Butts and Bankus conclude that cooperation 
with China on foreign aid policy would augment existing efforts. They propose that China’s 
foreign aid policy should be broadened to better incorporate human security issues and other 
development issues. They suggest that approaching China in this manner would create a 
confidence building measure under a new President, and avoid China’s Africa engagement 
evolving into a zero sum game (Butts & Bankus, 2009). 
 Former US Ambassador David Shinn states that US-China interests are more similar than 
they appear. Both countries want to expand their foreign trade, provide education and cultural 
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cooperation, encourage sustainable, free market economic growth and provide assistance on 
health issues. China and the US both try to obtain political support from as many African states 
as possible. Also, both countries have significant natural resource interests, although the US 
interest is primarily oil (Shinn, 2009). Ambassador Shinn argues that the American and Chinese 
interests in Africa parallel each other but that current trends in US-African engagement may lead 
to China gaining a short term continental advantage. His argument proves that similar interests 
could allow for a broader cooperation on US-Chinese interests in Africa. 
Why the Chinese Would Cooperate with the US 
First, there is some cooperation already occurring. Liberia is a fragile African state. The 
US and the Chinese have been active to help rebuild the state infrastructure and institutions. The 
US has primarily focused on rebuilding Liberia’s armed forces, through training and recruitment, 
and has developed the management capability of Ministry of Defense’s civilian employees. The 
Chinese have been rebuilding much of the support infrastructure for those armed forces, 
including offices for government officials. They deployed some 570 military engineers to help 
rebuild basic infrastructure (“U.S. and Chinese…,” 2008). Thus, the US and China have been 
able to cooperate for Liberia’s benefit. 
Numerous commentators have suggested Chinese engagement with Africa should be 
embraced and assisted. Davis and Woetzel argue that Chinese engagement with national and 
regional organizations instead of only heads of state, their hosting of roundtables, FOCAC 
meetings, and establishing of development banks such as the China–Africa Development Fund 
all are examples of where greater US cooperation could provide a broader impact. 5 
China has shown a greater willingness for greater cooperation on foreign aid and 
investment. In December 2009, China hosted an international roundtable to discuss health care 
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collaboration, inviting NGOs, academics, African health officials and other international partners 
in hopes of fostering joint missions, pilot projects and other cooperation in order to best deliver 
health care to African countries (Davis & Woetzel, 2010).  
Essentially, this sort of cooperation best legitimizes China as a true great power, the goal 
of Beijing’s ambitions. It shows that China has arrived as a country that can not only do foreign 
aid and engagement themselves but partner with other countries to provide a catalyst for 
increased development. In Australia, Secretary Clinton encouraged China to take on a role in the 
international community that is fitting for their size and new found wealth.  
 
Policy Suggestions 
Zimbabwe 
 The US and China should cooperate on issues relating to Zimbabwe’s political 
leadership. The US has long advocated for a peaceful, democratic transition in Zimbabwe, 
mostly recently by UN Ambassador Susan Rice (AFP, 2009). Former ambassador to Zimbabwe 
Christopher W. Dell described Mugabe as a “brilliant tactician” but was hindered by “his deep 
ignorance on economic issues (coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him the 
authority to suspend the laws of economics) (Shane, & Lehren, 2010).” In the past and as 
recently as 2008, China has opposed UN sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to President Robert 
Mugabe’s human rights violations (Worsnip, 2008). China has long supported Mugabe and his 
government. 
 Zimbabwe’s economic woes have resulted in China refusing to provide additional loans 
until payments on existing loans resume. Thus, China has grown increasingly dissatisfied by 
Mugabe and his government. What may prompt the Chinese towards cooperation with the US on 
Zimbabwe’s democratic transition would be the they own there. The Chinese own a number of 
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valuable assets that were put up as collateral for loans and non-payment has allowed an increase 
in ownership stakes (Moyo, 2010).  
 Convincing China that the US will respect those stakes and encourage other countries 
to do the same could win China’s cooperation on a democratic transition. Support would begin 
with cooperation on UN sanctions as any sanction would be favorable to China’s interests so 
long as they do not directly support Mugabe. Building that support and the subsequent effects of 
the sanctions could lead to a relatively peaceful democratic transition. At present, Mugabe is 
relatively weak by comparison to previous years and is especially dependent upon support from 
China. Removing that support would greatly delegitimize him as a leader as his primary UN 
support would be gone. The economic leverage that China has over Zimbabwe could also be 
utilized for a transition to free and fair democracy. In particular, recent months have seen him 
making particularly blatant appreciative gestures to the Chinese, possibility as an apology for 
non-payment and a reaffirmation of the Mugabe-China relationship. Removing China from 
Mugabe’s list of allies should be part of the larger strategy to keep Mugabe making mistakes and 
overall throw him off his game, as former US Ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell 
advocated in a diplomatic cable (07HARARE638). 
Sudan Referendum 
The US and China could work together on the issue of the Sudanese referendum. With 
US cooperation, China should utilize their leverage over President Bashir to allow for a peaceful, 
free and fair referendum in January on the issue of south Sudanese independence.  
In the past, the Chinese have resisted all attempts to sanction Sudan’s top export, oil. 
They receive approximately 60% of Sudan’s oil exports. The US should guarantee the Chinese 
access to a similar amount of oil elsewhere, possibly in Saudi Arabia or in the Gulf states. Global 
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oil market trends are shifting Middle Eastern oil exports towards Asia so the US guarantee would 
be part of a natural market shift anyway. There is still a significant amount of excess capacity left 
in both crude and refining markets in those regions due to the recent economic events (Likvern, 
2010). Those countries would appreciate the opportunity to sell additional crude and refining 
capacity while keeping prices relatively stable. Such a guarantee would also allow for UN 
sanctions on Sudanese oil exports. Additionally, the US would agree to help China secure oil 
rights in a southern Sudanese state should the referendum results dictate. A further diplomatic 
carrot could be US support for Chinese foreign aid programs within any newly created Sudanese 
state. The Chinese have particular leverage over Sudan as they have invested in non-oil sectors. 
The US and China should present the possibility of UN sanctions in a united diplomatic front to 
Sudan before the referendum. It would serve as a way to pressure President Bashir to respecting 
any election result as legitimate.  
This is more probable in recent years as the Chinese have grown more aware of the 
damage Sudanese issues have been causing to their international image. President Hu Jintao and 
Chinese African envoy Liu Guijin have held terse discussions with President Bashir on Sudanese 
issues. Liu Guijin has described Darfur as a humanitarian disaster. Thus, there is some 
movement for the US to work together with China to pressure Sudan. Also, the Chinese are 
highly diplomatically ambitious and long to play an important role in international affairs. In 
Sudan, they have the most leverage and much of the credit for any positive development would 
rightfully go to them. It is another avenue for the US to tap into as they attempt to engage China 
on Sudan. 
The best possible conclusion for the southern Sudanese referendum would be 
independence for a southern Sudanese state with US and Chinese backing. At worst, China may 
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lose Sudan as an oil supply on a temporary basis if Khartoum blocks southern Sudanese oil 
exports from reaching the coast. However, an alternative routing to the port of Mombasa through 
Kenya could be arranged either as a pipeline or via a railway as China has experience building 
both cost effectively.  
State Building in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 One of the most pervasive and comprehensive problems in sub-Saharan Africa is the 
fragile state of D.R. Congo. They have made a largely unsuccessful transition from a dictatorial 
state into what constitutes a democratic state primarily at face value. Foreign Policy’s Failed 
States Index of 2010 ranked the fifth most failed state, even below Afghanistan and Iraq.6 In 
addition, there are several regional disputes, mostly related to the aftermath of the Congo Wars 
of the 1990’s that could be resolved to an extent with a stronger state. While the situation has 
improved to a moderate extent, a serious effort at strengthening the government will go far in 
terms of helping the Congolese as well as resolving some of the most serious human rights 
situations in eastern Congo. US-China Cooperation on Congolese state building is particularly 
relevant as China recently signed one of the largest foreign aid and investment deals ever with 
the Congolese government, building some 9 billion dollars worth of infrastructure in exchange 
for extensive mining and mineral rights.  
 One example of potential US China cooperation is to coordinate agricultural aid in 
Congo. Currently underway is a project in Kisangani, eastern Congo run by US AFRICOM and 
the Borlaug Institute, whose goal is to help the Congolese army feed itself. Currently, the army 
often has to resort to pillaging whatever they can find from the villages in which they are 
deployed to (Shattenberg, 2010). This project can have a broader impact as it not only helps an 
army feed itself but serves to strengthen the state as the army can be more effective and have less 
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impact upon the civilian population who have borne the brunt of the Congo conflicts. The 
Chinese have a long history of agricultural aid and more recent investment in Africa, sending 
agricultural experts over since the 1950s although their impact have been limited due to lack of 
coordination (Davis & Woetzal, 2010). Thus, the Chinese would also benefit from US 
cooperation and could greatly augment agricultural aid programs with increased funding.  
Validation of Policy Suggestions 
In a February 2010 cable entitled Chinese Engagement in Kenya, Ambassador Michael E. 
Ranneberger suggests that Chinese interest in developing a new mega-port in Lamu, Kenya 
comes from a desire to build regional infrastructure including a pipeline to southern Sudan. If 
built, it would reduce China’s reliance on Port Sudan in north Sudan (10NAIROBI181). This 
validates the policy suggestion of China wanting to reduce their reliance upon Khartoum and 
opens up the possibility US-China cooperation. 
In Angola, the US Ambassador discussed with the Chinese Ambassador cooperation on 
agricultural development in addition to existing cooperation on a Department of Defense 
humanitarian assistance program and joint efforts on malaria programming (10LUANDA84). 
The cable’s title Chinese Engagement in Angola and Potential Areas for Cooperation highlights 
the thinking of key US government officials as viewing the US-China relationship as mutually 
beneficial instead of detrimentally competitive. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the conventional wisdom that Chinese foreign aid policy and overall engagement 
may seem detrimental for US interests at face value, there is a clear argument for the contrary. 
US and Chinese interests are not mutually exclusive and share similar objectives. Instead of 
competing for resources and influence, the US and China can cooperate on jointly developing 
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Africa as well as furthering their own interests. Thus, the thesis that Chinese engagement and 
foreign aid policy in Africa is detrimental to US interests has proven to be false.  
 The benefits for collaboration between the US and China are enormous and most evident 
through the case studies provided. US-China cooperation could boost state building in D.R. 
Congo which is a step towards resolving a host of issues in central Africa. On the issue of the 
Sudanese referendum, the US and China could support a possibly independent southern Sudan 
which would support both countries’ interests. In Zimbabwe, the withdrawal of Chinese support 
for Robert Mugabe would be significant in forcing him from power which serves US and 
Chinese agendas as the Chinese could finally have an ally that would resume payments in a 
timelier manner. It would also draw less attention to China’s own human rights record. 
There will be no more important relationship in the 21st century than the one between the 
United States and China. The US and China could embark on an entire new level to cooperation 
on foreign aid and investment policies in Africa. Both sides are rapidly investing billions in raw 
materials as well as pumping up their respective foreign aid programs. Those interests intersect 
and are ripe for collaboration. Numerous synergies would emerge if both countries were to 
collaborate on solving development issues. Cooperation on an issue that is outside both 
countries’ immediate spheres of influence will go far in cultivating the relationship. Ultimately, 
the US can channel some of China’s African foreign aid and engagement into a larger role that 
supports both countries’ interests while driving a new level of development in Africa. 
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